In the leader election problem, n players wish to elect a random leader. The difficulty is that some coalition of players may conspire to elect one of its own members.
Introduction
This paper is about leader election and a related problem, collective coin-flipping. Since coin-flipping is perhaps more basic, we begin by discussing that problem.
In a distributed computing environment common random bits may be required. Collective coin-flipping is the problem of obtaining such bits if some processors are faulty. If people are behind the processors, the faults may be malicious; to be safe, we assume malicious faults. Following Ben-Or and Linial [BL90] , we assume that all communication is by broadcast and any message contains the identity of the sender. Processors may broadcast messages simultaneously.
The simplest method for n processors, called players, to generate a collective random bit is as follows. A suitable function f : f0;1g n ! f0;1g is chosen in advance. Then each player broadcasts a random r i 2 f0;1g, and the collective random bit is taken to be r = f (r 1 ; : : : ; r n ).
To achieve the strongest results, we allow a subset B n] of bad players to collude to bias the bit. In particular, they may not choose their r i 's randomly. We can obtain different models depending on whether the distributed environment is synchronous and whether the bad players' computational power is limited. This paper focuses on the most difficult of these possibilities.
In a synchronous environment, the players cannot see other players' choices for r i . Thus, PARITY will output a perfectly unbiased bit if even one player is honest. On the other hand, our model assumes an asynchronous environment: although messages are supposed to be sent in parallel, they may be sent in any order. Therefore, the bad players may wait to see the honest players' choices before they act. In this case, PARITY is foiled by just one bad player.
If the bad players' computational power is restricted to polynomial-time, then the players can use cryptography to communicate with each other privately (assuming one-way trapdoor functions exist). The resulting problem is related to Byzantine agreement. To avoid relying on unproven assumptions and to obtain the strongest possible results, our model allows unlimited computational power for the bad players. This is called the perfect information model, and was first introduced in the context of collective coin-flipping by Ben-Or and Linial [BL90] .
A function f is called resilient if it gives rise to a robust coin-flipping protocol: 
Theorem 1 ([AL93]
). There exists a family of functions which is εn= log 2 n-resilient, for a small enough positive constant ε.
There is also a lower bound:
In order to achieve larger resilience, we allow the protocols to last many rounds and allow players to send many bits in each round. Each round is asynchronous: within a round, the bad players may wait to see the communication of the good players. Between rounds, the processors are synchronized. The notion of resilience is extended in a natural way to this multi-round scenario.
We now broaden the discussion to include leader election protocols. In this case, the protocol is supposed to pick a uniformly random leader among the n processors. Resilience is then defined as: Definition 2. A leader election protocol is called b(n)-resilient if there is a constant δ < 1 which upper bounds the probability that any coalition of size b(n) can elect one of its own members.
Note that if there is a k-round leader election protocol, then there is a k + 1-round coin-flipping protocol with the same resilience: in one more round the leader can flip the coin.
One example of a leader election protocol is called baton passing. Initially, player 1 holds the baton. In each round, the player holding the baton passes it to a player who has not yet held the baton. The last player to hold the baton is called the leader. Saks [Sak89] showed that if the honest players toss the baton randomly (among those players who have not yet touched the baton), this protocol is εn= log nresilient for a small enough positive constant ε. Saks also observed that no protocol can be dn=2e-resilient (see [BN] for a proof).
The last decade has witnessed remarkable improvement in our understanding of this problem, culminating in constructive, O(log n)-round protocols which are ( 1 2 ? ε)nresilient [ORV94, Zuc97] for any fixed ε > 0. The historical summary in Figure 1 briefly charts this progress. We present a constructive leader election protocol requiring only log n+O(1) rounds to achieve ( 1 2 ?ε)n-resilience.
This protocol can be modified to yield improved constant round protocols, offering εn=(log (k) n) 3 -resilience in k rounds for a small enough constant ε. This is constructive for k 3.
We also remark that if the bad players' computational power were restricted to polynomial-time (and one-way trapdoor functions exist), then the Byzantine agreement protocol of Feldman and Micali [FM97] may be used to achieve an b(n?1)=3c-resilient leader election protocol that takes a constant number of expected rounds.
Preliminaries
We denote the set f1;::: ; ng by n]. The logarithm base 2 is denoted log n and the natural logarithm ln n. In general, we ignore rounding errors when their effect is insignificant.
Our protocol uses two combinatorial constructions: a "balanced" poly-logarithmic set system and a hitting set for combinatorial rectangles. These are introduced below in x2.1 and x2.2. As a final preparatory step, x2.3 is devoted to bounding a class of recurrence relations related to the protocol.
Balanced Set Systems and Committee Selection via Extractors
A paradigm appearing frequently in the leader election literature is the recursive application of "committee" selection. Briefly, the description of the n-player protocol includes a collection of (overlapping) committees of the n players, each of size s n. One such committee is then selected, which removes from consideration all players but those in the selected committee. The remaining players then carry out the s-player protocol to elect the final leader. Assuming that some β fraction of the players are corrupt, a natural property to desire on the part of this family of committees is that regardless of which subset of the players are corrupt, very few of the committees have much more than a β fraction of corrupt members. If a committee can then be selected nearly randomly, we can recurse on an appropriately balanced collection of players. Specifically, the committees we use shall have the properties outlined in Definition 4, below. 
Definition 4.
A balanced family is a family of set systems
2. for any B X, the number of B-saturated committees is O(n 1:1 ).
As one would expect, a random collection of n O(1) such sets can easily be shown to satisfy the above properties with high probability, proving existence. We need an explicit construction, which is supplied by extractor constructions (see [Nis96] for a survey of extractors and their applications). We restate the extractor construction we need in our framework, making use of the observation that if there is a balanced set system of size f (n) and g(n) f (n), then there is one of size g(n).
Theorem 3 ([Zuc97]).
For all polynomial-time computable functions g : N ! N with g(n) = n O(1) , there is a polynomial-time constructible family of balanced set systems of size g(n).
Hitting Sets for Combinatorial Rectangles
Our protocol shall select a committee by identifying the committees with a sparse "hitting set" of k] n .
which intersects every combinatorial rectangle of volume at least ε. When the universe is understood, such a set will be referred to as an ε-hitting set.
An easy probabilistic proof shows that there exist 
A Lemma about Poly-Logarithmic Decay
In order to avoid logarithms of negative numbers, we define iterated logarithms as follows. For n 1 and k 2 N,
with ln (0) n = n. Then, for n 1, define log (n) to be the smallest natural number k for which ln (k) n = 1. We will need the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Let T : N ! N be a well-defined function given by the recurrence relation:
for a function f = (ln n) O(1) and constants t 0 and n T . Then
Proof. Choose c so that f (n) < b(lnn) c c for all sufficiently large n. For convenience, assume that c > 2. Then, defining S(n) as
there is an appropriate choice of the constants n S and s 0 so that S is well defined and, for all n 2 N, T (n) S(n). For convenience assume that n S > c 3c . Now, for n 1 and
since c > 2. Recalling that n S > c 3c , the lemma follows.
The Protocol
The protocol we present below is recursive, each step discarding all but a small committee of players. The base case invokes the following result of Boppana and Narayanan:
Theorem 6 ([BN]).
Although this is non-constructive in general, we need the result only for a specific (constant) value n 0 so that the protocol can, of course, be found by exhaustive search (trying all possible protocols and strategies for the bad players).
Since our protocol selects a committee of size (ln n) O(1) in a single round, we focus on functions
where X is some appropriately selected domain. The combinatorial core of the protocol is the following lemma.
Lemma 7. For all β < 1, there is a polynomial time computable family of functions
o so that for any set B n] of size at most βn, the probability that for a random setting of the variables outside B, some setting of the variables of B produces a B-saturated committee f (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) is at most O(1=n). The set X can be taken to be f0;1g logn .
Proof. Our function f n builds upon the protocol of [ORV94] . In that protocol, a suitable polynomial-sized set C of possible committees is fixed at the beginning. Then, in each round, each player eliminates a 1=(2n) fraction of committees uniformly at random. After O(log n) rounds, there is at least one committee remaining, and with high probability no remaining committee is B-saturated.
We would like to achieve this in one round. The natural starting idea is for each player to eliminate a Θ((log n)=n) fraction of the committees, as this will also ensure that with high probability no remaining committee is saturated. Unfortunately, this would allow the bad players to eliminate all the committees. The key idea is to restrict the possible collections of committees that a player may eliminate. Below we give a way to do this which prevents the players from eliminating all the committees.
We follow [Zuc97] , using extractors to define the polynomial-sized set C of possible committees. To define the appropriate parameters, let k = (1 ? β)n=(3 lnn).
Since Given that (1 ? β)n of the variables will be selected randomly, we would like to see that the probability that f (b 1 ; : : : ; b n ) is B-saturated is small. The probability that a B-saturated committee C i remains is Then, recalling that there are O(n 1:1 ) B-saturated committees, the probability that any B-saturated committee survived is at most O(n ?1:9 ), which is O(n ?1 ), as desired. Proof. We apply Lemma 7 recursively until the resulting number of players is at most n 0 , a suitable constant to be chosen later. We then apply Theorem 6. Lemma 5 shows that this protocol does indeed terminate in log n + O(1) rounds.
Fix β < 1 2 . There are two types of error to control. First, there isβ(n), the maximum possible resulting fraction of bad players when the protocol begins with n players (βn of which are corrupt), assuming only unsaturated committees were chosen at each step. Then
By choosing n 0 large enough, we can ensure thatβ(n) is bounded away from 1 2 for all n, which is what we need to apply Theorem 6.
Second, there is the error E(n) that, with n starting players, a B-saturated committee is chosen somewhere in the recursion. This error satisfies
E(n) E((log n) O(1) ) + O(1=n):
This can be made arbitrarily small by choosing n 0 large enough. In fact, we only need it to be less than 1, since we ensure that conditional on reaching n 0 players with all unsaturated committees, there is a constant probability that the protocol given by Theorem 6 will select a good leader.
Constant Round Protocols
Coupling Lemma 7 with the εn=(log n) 2 -resilient functions of Ajtai-Linial (see Theorem 1, above), we present k-round leader election protocols which, for small enough ε k > 0, are ε k n=(log (k) n) 3 -resilient.
The Functions of Ajtai-Linial and Sublinear Coalitions
Definition 7. Let f : f0;1g n ! f0;1g be a boolean function on variables fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g. The influence of a set S fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g on f , written I f (S), is the probability that the function is undetermined by a random setting of the variables outside S.
Ajtai and Linial [AL93] have shown the existence of a family of functions for which the influence of any set of εn=(log n) 2 variables is O(ε). As the base case of our constant round constructions, we need a family of functions for which the influence of any set of εn=(log n) 3 variables is O(ε= log n). A simple adaptation of the proof in [AL93] shows that the functions they construct also enjoy this property. For completeness, we briefly outline their construction adapted to the case we need. We also provide a streamlined proof of one portion of their result.
Theorem 9 (Adapted from [AL93]).
There is a sequence of boolean functions f n on n = 1; 2; : : : variables, having expectation 1 2 + o(1), such that for every ε > 0, for any large enough n, the influence of any set of εn=(log n) 3 variables is O(ε= log n). The time to construct such a function deterministically is n O(n) . The collection of sequences P = (P 1 ; : : : ; P n ) with each P i 2 P is denoted P . Defining M to be the collection of all mappings m : f1;::: ; ng ! f0;1g, the collection of all sequences m = (m 1 ; : : : ; m n ) with each m i 2 M is denotedM . Finally, for P 2P and m 2M , let f = f P;m be the function
Proof
where P i j denotes the jth class of the partition P i . For convenience, let
Definition 8. A partition P 2 P and a set B f1;::: ; ng are said to match if for each 1 k b, the number of classes
Notice that if the partition P is selected randomly, then the probability that a certain P j contains more than k elements of B is at most 2. For almost all P and every set B f1;::: ; ng with jBj = εn=(log n) 3 , the number of partitions P i in P failing to match B is o(n= log n).
3. For a partition P i in P and m i 2 M , the influence of any set B f1;::: ; ng with jBj = εn=(log n) 3 on f i is at most These two events are independent. The probability of event 1 is at most Now focus on event 2. For a fixed class P i j with P i j \B = k, the probability that x s = m i (s) for all s 2 P i j nB is 2 k?b . Since P i matches B, the probability of event 2 is bounded above by
Recalling that b = log n ?2loglogn+o(1), we have b2 b
(1 ?o(1)) n logn so that the above sum is bounded by
Anticipating the proof of step 2, we record Azuma's inequality for discrete martingales.
Definition 9.
A martingale is a sequence X 1 ; X 2 ; : : : ; X n of real valued random variables for which E X i+1 j X i ] = X i . . Let E k be the event that 
Notice that, by definition, E Z p+1 j Z p ] = Z p , so that these Z p form a martingale. Furthermore, jZ p+1 ?Z p j 1, the proof for which we defer for a moment. In this case, application of Azuma's inequality yields
since the quantity
log n , and an application of Markov's inequality shows that with probability 1 ? o(1) the number of P i which do not match B is o( n log n ).
We return to the proof that jZ p+1 ?Z p j 1. Fix a vector x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x p ) 2 f0;1g p . The only interesting case is when wt(x) < jBj. Then, forx 2 f0;1g, 
since at most element of B is left up to chance. The claim follows.
A function satisfying the conditions in the theorem can be found in time n O(n) . This follows from two observations. First, P n!, and M = 2 n , so the number of possible functions is n O(n) . Second, a function can be tested for the desired property in exponential time.
Constant Round Protocols
With Theorem 9 in hand, it is not difficult to show that there exist one round leader election protocols resilient against coalitions of size O(n=(ln n) 3 ):
Lemma 11. There exists a family of functions g n : X n ! n] so that for any set of variables B of size εn (ln n) 3 , the probability that for a random setting of the variables outside B, there is a completion so that F(x) 2 B is O(ε). The set X can be taken to be f0;1g
Proof. Consider the probability distribution where each x i = x i1 : : : x ik is selected independently and uniformly at random in f0;1g 8 log n . Set Y j = f n (x 1 j ; x 2 j ; : : : ; x n j ). This is a stream of independent From the bound of Theorem 9, the probability that a ran- Theorem 12. For k 2 N, there is ε k > 0 for which there is a k round leader election protocol resilient against coalitions of size ε k n=(ln (k) n) 3 . This is constructive for k 3.
Proof. The first k ? 1 rounds are given by the protocol of Lemma 7. The last round is given by the protocol of Lemma 11. The errors are handled as in Theorem 8.
Open Question
An outstanding open question is whether there exists a constant round leader election protocol resilient against linear-sized coalitions. It is unknown even whether there is such a one round protocol.
